

IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Application Number : 09/883,502 Confirmation No.: 8691
Applicant : Jeffrey A. Bedell et al.
Filed : June 19, 2001
Title : REPORT SYSTEM AND METHOD USING PROMPT OBJECTS
TC/Art Unit : 2178
Examiner: : Cong-Lac Huynh
Atty. Docket No. : 53470.003037
Customer No. : **21967**

APPEAL BRIEF

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In response to the Notice of Panel Decision from Pre-Appeal Brief Review dated February 24, 2009 and the Final Office Action dated December 2, 2008 ("Office Action"), rejecting claims 1-28, Appellants respectfully request that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences reconsider and withdraw the rejections of record, and allow the pending claims, which are attached hereto as an Appendix.

I. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

The real party in interest is Microstrategy, Inc., the assignee of the above-referenced application.

II. RELATED APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

There are no known related appeals or interferences.

III. STATUS OF CLAIMS

Claims 1-28 are currently pending in this application. Claims 1-28 are currently rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being allegedly anticipated by U.S. Publication No. 2002/0069207 to Alexander et al. ("Alexander"). The rejections of claims 1-28 are appealed.

IV. STATUS OF AMENDMENTS

No amendments to the claims have been filed subsequent to the Office Action dated December 2, 2008.

V. SUMMARY OF CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER

Appellants believe that a brief discussion of the background technology, followed by a brief summary of the embodiments of the invention and the problems solved by the embodiments of the present invention, will assist the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) in appreciating the significant advances made by the embodiments of the present invention. Finally, concise explanations of each of the independent claims are provided, including reference to exemplary portions of the specification and figures.

A. The Background

Reporting system and decision support system have been developed to efficiently retrieve selected information from data warehouses. One type of decision support system is known as an on-line analytical processing system (“OLAP”). In general, OLAP systems analyze the data from a number of different perspectives and support complex analyses against large input data sets. OLAP systems generate output upon execution of a report that includes a template to indicate the way to present the output and a filter to specify the conditions of data on which the report is to be processed. *See, e.g.,* Specification at page 1, lines 8-14.

Reports may be extremely complicated and require many seconds, minutes, and sometimes even hours to process. Designing such complex reports is labor intensive. Further, in current systems, once a report is designed, if a user desires to change the template, filter, or any other sub-object or component, a completely new report must be created through the same laborious tasks. Although some report writing wizards have been developed in this field, those

wizards also must be programmed and often only provide specific options from which a report designer may choose. Accordingly, the report writing wizards are often not useful to the report designer that generates a complex report. The inflexibility of current report creation systems is a drawback of current OLAP. Other drawbacks with current systems exist as well. *See, e.g.,* Specification at page 1, line 15 – page 2, line 2.

B. The Embodiments of The Present Invention

Accordingly, the present invention provides prompt objects that may be used to define some or every aspect of a report. A prompt object in object-oriented programming terms is a separate object from any report in which it is contained. In one embodiment, a prompt object contains a single question to be answered, validation values for the answer, and attributes indicating how the prompt object is to be processed. In addition, default values may be provided for the prompt object. *See, e.g.,* Specification at page 2, lines 4-9.

A report can thus be defined by selecting prompt objects in place of portions of static report definition including, but not limited to, templates, filters, or any of the aspects of a template or filter. Report definition involves specification of the elements to generate an output. For example, if a template is defined by a prompt object, then when a report is executed, the report prompts the user to select a template. The selected template is then validated based on the prompt object validation values and then processed. *See, e.g.,* Specification at page 2, lines 10-15.

By using prompts that are resolved at run-time, a complex report may be created that enables a wide variety of variation, depending on user preferences. A relatively untrained person may then execute the report, respond to the prompts and get a customized report. Additionally, in OLAP systems, a metadata database is often used to assist in accessing data from the data

warehouse. The metadata may include report definitions, which limits the users who may create their own reports. By defining a report using prompts, users effectively create their own report based on the answers they provide to the prompts. *See, e.g.,* Specification at page 2, line 16 – page 3, line 2.

In addition, by creating each prompt as a separate prompt object, a number of advantages are realized. A single prompt may be shared by many other objects that are part of a report. That single prompt may then be asked of the user only once, resolved and then the answer may be provided for each place in which the prompt object is referenced. Also, as a prompt object, the validation values may be stored in the prompt object so that each time a particular prompt is used, the validation values are used to ensure that the answer is valid. Answers given to a prompt object may be stored in association with the prompt object so that in future executions of a report or execution of other reports that reference the same prompt object, that answer may be provided as a default value with or without prompting the user. Further, by using prompt objects, other functions such as prompt in prompt and prompt object abstraction for report delivery may be provided. *See, e.g.,* Specification at page 3, lines 3-15.

Additionally, unlike report wizards where the programmer of the report wizard hard-codes the available options to present to the user, by defining a report using prompt objects, a report designer may create a customized report wizard by selecting the prompt objects to include in the report. The benefit is illustrated by an example. A report wizard has a fixed number of questions and answers to be provided before it creates a report. By using prompt objects, the report creator determines the number of questions. Instead of requiring the user to input fifteen answers, therefore, the user may only be required to provide two. Also, the questions to be asked of the user may be changed by selecting different prompt objects, rather than having to rewrite

the wizard code. *See*, e.g., Specification at page 3, line 16 – page 4, line 2.

C. Explanation of Independent Claim 1

A prompt object on a computer-readable medium used in creating a report to be executed in a reporting system, wherein the report may specify a prompt object as a property of the report (*See*, e.g., Figs. 1-2, 4-5; Specification, p. 5, line 16 – p. 18, line 5), the prompt object comprising:

a question to be asked of a user (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 14, line 5; p. 16, lines 14-15; p. 26, line 7 – p. 28, line 5);

a prompt type (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 2, line 7 – p. 3, line 7; p. 16, lines 15-18; p. 26, line 7 – p. 28, line 5; p. 35, line 8); and

at least one validation property (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 16, lines 18-21; p. 35, line 15);

wherein the prompt object is used in creating a report to be executed in a reporting system, wherein the report may specify a prompt object as a property of the report, and wherein the prompt object is an object separate from the report such that the prompt object may be used more than once in a single report or may be used in more than one report (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 2, lines 4-9; p. 3, lines 3-12; p. 15, lines 7-20).

D. Explanation of Independent Claim 6

A computer-implemented method of creating a report to be executed on a reporting system (*See*, e.g., Figs. 1-2, 4-5; Specification, p. 5, line 16 – p. 18, line 5) the method comprising the steps of:

selecting a template with one or more template properties (*See*, e.g., Figs. 8, 10, and 11; Specification, p. 2, lines 10-15);

selecting a filter with one or more filter properties (*See*, e.g., Figs. 8, 10, and 11;

Specification, p. 2, lines 10-15); and

specifying one or more of the template or filter properties with a prompt object (*See*, e.g., Figs. 8, 10, and 11; Specification, p. 2, lines 10-15);

wherein the prompt object comprises:

a question to be asked of a user (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 14, line 5; p. 16, lines 14-15; p. 26, line 7 – p. 28, line 5);

a prompt type (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 2, line 7 – p. 3, line 7; p. 16, lines 15-18; p. 26, line 7 – p. 28, line 5; p. 35, line 8); and

at least one validation property (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 16, lines 18-21; p. 35, line 15), wherein the prompt object is an object separate from the report and separate from the one or more templates or filters such that the prompt object may be used more than once in a single report or may be used in more than one report (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 2, lines 4-9; p. 3, lines 3-12; p. 15, lines 7-20).

E. Explanation of Independent Claim 14

A processor-readable medium comprising code for execution by a processor to create a report to be executed on a reporting system (*See*, e.g., Figs. 1-2, 4-5; Specification, p. 5, line 16 – p. 18, line 5), the medium comprising:

code for causing a processor to enable a user to select a template with one or more template properties (*See*, e.g., Figs. 8, 10, and 11; Specification, p. 2, lines 10-15);

code for causing a processor to enable a user to select a filter with one or more filter properties (*See*, e.g., Figs. 8, 10, and 11; Specification, p. 2, lines 10-15); and

code for causing a processor to enable a user to specify one or more of the template or filter properties with a prompt object (*See*, e.g., Figs. 8, 10, and 11; Specification, p. 2, lines 10-

15);

wherein the prompt object (*See*, e.g., Figs. 1-2, 4-5; Specification, p. 5, line 16 – p. 18, line 5) comprises:

a question to be asked of a user (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 14, line 5; p. 16, lines 14-15; p. 26, line 7 – p. 28, line 5);

a prompt type (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 2, line 7 – p. 3, line 7; p. 16, lines 15-18; p. 26, line 7 – p. 28, line 5; p. 35, line 8); and

at least one validation property (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 16, lines 18-21; p. 35, line 15), wherein the prompt object is an object separate from the report such that the prompt object may be used more than once in a single report or may be used in more than one report (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 2, lines 4-9; p. 3, lines 3-12; p. 15, lines 7-20).

F. Explanation of Independent Claim 21

A system for a report to be executed on a reporting system (*See*, e.g., Figs. 1-2, 4-5; Specification, p. 5, line 16 – p. 18, line 5) comprising of:

report selection means embodied on a computer-readable medium that enables a report creator to define one or more of a template, filter, or properties thereof with a prompt object (*See*, e.g., Figs. 8, 10, and 11; Specification, p. 2, lines 10-15);

wherein the prompt object (*See*, e.g., Figs. 1-2, 4-5; Specification, p. 5, line 16 – p. 18, line 5) comprises:

a question to be asked of a user (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 14, line 5; p. 16, lines 14-15; p. 26, line 7 – p. 28, line 5);

a prompt type (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 2, line 7 – p. 3, line 7; p. 16, lines 15-18; p. 26, line 7 – p. 28, line 5; p. 35, line 8); and

at least one validation property (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 16, lines 18-21; p. 35, line 15), wherein the prompt object is an object separate from the report such that the prompt object may be used more than once in a single report or may be used in more than one report (*See*, e.g., Specification, p. 2, lines 4-9; p. 3, lines 3-12; p. 15, lines 7-20).

VI. GROUNDS OF REJECTION TO BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL

The issue on appeal is whether the following rejections are proper:

The rejection of claims 1-28 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being allegedly anticipated by U.S. Publication No. 2002/0069207 to Alexander et al. (“Alexander”).

VII. ARGUMENT

The rejections against the pending claims under consideration in the above-identified patent application should be reversed for at least the reasons set forth below.

A. Brief Description of the Art Applied to the Claims

U.S. Publication No. 2002/0069207 to Alexander

Alexander purports to disclose a system and method for creating, conducting, and analyzing surveys (*See*, e.g., Alexander, Abstract). Alexander purports to disclose a survey created by a survey manager where the survey encompasses a question or set of questions that elicit an answer or series of answers (*See*, e.g., Alexander, [0006]-[0012]). More specifically, in Alexander’s system, a user may: (1) “only select one of the possible answers;” (2) select “a single suggested answer or to enter a more appropriate answer than those suggested;” (3) select “as many suggested answers as appropriate;” or (4) enter a “free text answer [that] does not provide any suggested answers, but allows the user to enter an appropriate answer.” (*See*, e.g., Alexander, [0027], [0029], and [0034]). Alexander’s system may import the results of the survey to electronic files (*See*, e.g., Alexander, [0011]).

B. The Rejection of Claims 1-28 Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) is Improper

Claims 1-28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being allegedly anticipated by U.S. Publication No. 2002/0069207 to Alexander. Appellants respectfully traverse this rejection.

1. Claim 1 is Separately Patentable

The rejection is improper because Alexander fails to teach each and every claim limitation for claim 1 rejected under 102(e).

Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the Patent Office bears the burden of presenting at least a prima facie case of anticipation. In re Sun, 31 USPQ2d 1451, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished). Anticipation requires that a prior art reference disclose, either expressly or under the principles of inherency, each and every element of the claimed invention. Id. “In addition, the prior art reference must be enabling.” Akzo N.V. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479, 1 USPQ2d 1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987). That is, the prior art reference must sufficiently describe the claimed invention so as to have placed the public in possession of it. In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533, 226 USPQ 619, 621 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Such possession is effected only if one of ordinary skill in the art could have combined the disclosure in the prior art reference with his/her own knowledge to make the claimed invention. Id. As stated in MPEP § 2131, “[a] claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

Referring to claim 1, the disclosure of Alexander fails to show at least the limitation directed to a “*prompt object* comprising: a question to be asked of a user; a *prompt type*; and at least one *validation property*” (emphasis added).

On page 3 of the Office Action, it is alleged that Alexander teaches these features in paragraphs [0027], [0029], and [0034]. However, in these paragraphs, Alexander discloses nothing more than a survey created by a survey manager. In fact, page 3 of the Office Action improperly equates the survey of Alexander with the claimed prompt object when it states that “survey, which is equivalent to a prompt object, is classified by types such as medical, political, or product preference.” The Office Action further alleges that “values assigned to the answers” are allegedly for “validating right answers” to constitute at least one validation property. Office Action at p. 3. Appellants respectfully disagree.

Contrary to the statements made in the Office Action, assigning different types of answers to questions in a survey does not imply that the survey includes a prompt type and a validation property for a data type of the answer. In fact, Alexander does not even use the terminology “validation,” “data type,” or “prompt type” anywhere in its disclosure. Furthermore, the Office Action alleges that because the prompt object includes a question and that Alexander’s surveys are classified by various types (e.g., “political, medical, or product preference”), the “survey type, thus, is the prompt object type.” Office Action at p. 6. This is clearly an improper assumption because the prompt object, as claimed, comprises both a “question” and a “prompt type.” Under the Office’s logic, the question is the *same* as the prompt type. This is clearly distinguishable from the claimed invention because the prompt object of claim 1 includes both a prompt type and a question. Fig. 14 of the present application clearly shows prompt types according to an exemplary embodiment.

Hence, it appears that the Office is arguing that Alexander’s survey *inherently* includes a prompt type and information that validates a “data-type” of the answer. Appellants note that:

“To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence ‘must make clear that the missing

descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill. Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745, 49 USPQ2d 1949, 1950-51 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

The cited paragraphs do not, however, disclose that Alexander’s survey necessarily includes a prompt type or a validation property to validate a “data type” of an answer. Rather, paragraphs [0027], [0029], and [0034] merely indicate that a user may: (1) “only select one of the possible answers;” (2) select “a single suggested answer or to enter a more appropriate answer than those suggested;” (3) select “as many suggested answers as appropriate;” or (4) enter a “free text answer [that] does not provide any suggested answers, but allows the user to enter an appropriate answer.” Nowhere does paragraph [0027], [0029], or [0034] of Alexander explicitly or implicitly teach that the survey includes a *prompt type* and a *validation property* for validating data types of answers. Alexander does not even disclose any component or program validating “data types” of answers, contrary to the assertion made in the Office Action. The Office Action speculates and improperly assumes that Alexander’s survey includes this feature, however, in light of *In re Robertson*, “[i]nherency. . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.” *Id.*

Thus, the Office has not shown that Alexander’s survey includes a prompt type *and* a validation property to anticipate the feature of “the prompt object comprising: ... a prompt type; and at least one validation property,” as recited in claim 1. Furthermore, dependent claim 2, for example, clarifies that the “at least one validation property comprises verification that the answer provided to the question is of the specified prompt type.” Nowhere is this taught or even mentioned in Alexander. Nevertheless, the Office Action improperly cites paragraphs (e.g.,

[0027], [0029], and [0034]) to assert that Alexander allegedly teaches these features.

As a result, the disclosure of Alexander fails to teach or show at least the limitation directed to “*prompt object* comprising: a question to be asked of a user; a *prompt type*; and at least one *validation property*,” as expressly recited in claim 1.

Accordingly, for at least this reason, Alexander does not teach **each and every limitation** of claim 1 and the rejection of claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) should be reversed.

2. Claim 2 is Separately Patentable

Claim 2 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose at least one validation property comprising verification that the answer provided to the question is of the specified prompt type. The Office Action’s rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 1. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 2. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 2 be reversed.

3. Claim 3 is Separately Patentable

Claim 3 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose a default answer to the question. The Office Action’s rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 1. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 3. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 3 be reversed.

4. Claim 4 is Separately Patentable

Claim 4 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose a meaning that, upon request by a responder to the prompt, provides an explanation of the question. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 1. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 4. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 4 be reversed.

5. Claim 5 is Separately Patentable

Claim 5 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose a reuse value that indicates whether an answer provided from a previous instance of that prompt object, a default value or a new value is to be used for an answer to the question in the prompt object. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 1. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 5. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 5 be reversed.

6. Claim 6 is Separately Patentable

The rejection is improper because **Alexander fails to teach each and every claim limitation** for claim 6 rejected under 102(e).

Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the Patent Office bears the burden of presenting at least a prima facie case of anticipation. In re Sun, 31 USPQ2d 1451, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished). Anticipation requires that a prior art reference disclose, either expressly or under the principles of inherency, each and every element of the claimed invention. Id. “In addition, the prior art reference must be enabling.” Akzo N.V. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479, 1 USPQ2d 1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987). That is, the prior art reference must sufficiently describe the claimed invention so as to have placed the public in possession of it. In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533, 226 USPQ 619, 621 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Such possession is effected only if one of ordinary skill in the art could have combined the disclosure in the prior art reference with his/her own knowledge to make the claimed invention. Id. As stated in MPEP § 2131, “[a] claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

Referring to claim 6, the disclosure of Alexander fails to show at least the limitation directed to a “***prompt object*** comprising: a question to be asked of a user; a ***prompt type***; and at least one ***validation property***” (emphasis added).

On page 3 of the Office Action, it is alleged that Alexander teaches these features in paragraphs [0027], [0029], and [0034]. However, in these paragraphs, Alexander discloses nothing more than a survey created by a survey manager. In fact, page 3 of the Office Action improperly equates the survey of Alexander with the claimed prompt object when it states that “survey, which is equivalent to a prompt object, is classified by types such as medical, political, or product preference.” The Office Action further alleges that “values assigned to the answers”

are allegedly for “validating right answers” to constitute at least one validation property. Office Action at p. 3. Appellants respectfully disagree.

Contrary to the statements made in the Office Action, assigning different types of answers to questions in a survey does not imply that the survey includes a prompt type and a validation property for a data type of the answer. In fact, Alexander does not even use the terminology “validation,” “data type,” or “prompt type” anywhere in its disclosure. Furthermore, the Office Action alleges that because the prompt object includes a question and that Alexander’s surveys are classified by various types (e.g., “political, medical, or product preference”), the “survey type, thus, is the prompt object type.” Office Action at p. 6. This is clearly an improper assumption because the prompt object, as claimed, comprises both a “question” and a “prompt type.” Under the Office’s logic, the question is the *same* as the prompt type. This is clearly distinguishable from the claimed invention because the prompt object of claim 6 includes both a prompt type and a question. Fig. 14 of the present application clearly shows prompt types according to an exemplary embodiment.

Hence, it appears that the Office is arguing that Alexander’s survey *inherently* includes a prompt type and information that validates a “data-type” of the answer. Appellants note that:

“To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence ‘must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill. Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.’” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745, 49 USPQ2d 1949, 1950-51 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

The cited paragraphs do not, however, disclose that Alexander’s survey necessarily includes a prompt type or a validation property to validate a “data type” of an answer. Rather, paragraphs [0027], [0029], and [0034] merely indicate that a user may: (1) “only select one of

the possible answers;” (2) select “a single suggested answer or to enter a more appropriate answer than those suggested;” (3) select “as many suggested answers as appropriate;” or (4) enter a “free text answer [that] does not provide any suggested answers, but allows the user to enter an appropriate answer.” Nowhere does paragraph [0027], [0029], or [0034] of Alexander explicitly or implicitly teach that the survey includes a ***prompt type*** and a ***validation property*** for validating data types of answers. Alexander does not even disclose any component or program validating “data types” of answers, contrary to the assertion made in the Office Action. The Office Action speculates and improperly assumes that Alexander’s survey includes this feature, however, in light of *In re Robertson*, “[i]nherency. . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.” *Id.*

Thus, the Office has not shown that Alexander’s survey includes a prompt type *and* a validation property to anticipate the feature of “the prompt object comprising: ... a prompt type; and at least one validation property,” as recited in claim 6. Furthermore, dependent claim 7, for example, clarifies that the “at least one validation property comprises verification that the answer provided to the question is of the specified prompt type.” Nowhere is this taught or even mentioned in Alexander. Nevertheless, the Office Action improperly cites paragraphs (e.g., [0027], [0029], and [0034]) to assert that Alexander allegedly teaches these features.

As a result, the disclosure of Alexander fails to teach or show at least the limitation directed to “***prompt object*** comprising: a question to be asked of a user; a ***prompt type***; and at least one ***validation property***,” as expressly recited in claim 6.

Accordingly, for at least this reason, Alexander does not teach **each and every limitation** of claim 6 and the rejection of claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) should be reversed.

7. Claim 7 is Separately Patentable

Claim 7 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose at least one validation property comprising verification that the answer provided to the question is of the specified prompt type. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 6. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 7. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 7 be reversed.

8. Claim 8 is Separately Patentable

Claim 8 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the prompt object further comprising a default answer to the question. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 6. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 8. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 8 be reversed.

9. Claim 9 is Separately Patentable

Claim 9 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the prompt object further comprising a meaning that, upon request by a responder to the prompt, provides an explanation of the question. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 6. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 9. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to

modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 9 be reversed.

10. Claim 10 is Separately Patentable

Claim 10 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the prompt object further comprising a reuse value that indicates whether an answer provided from a previous instance of that prompt object, a default value or a new value is to be used for an answer to the question in the prompt object. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 6. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 10. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 10 be reversed.

11. Claim 11 is Separately Patentable

Claim 11 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose specifying a single prompt object for a plurality of properties in the report and wherein upon report execution, the question receives only one answer that is provided to a each property properties for which the prompt object was specified. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 6. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 11. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 11 be reversed.

12. Claim 12 is Separately Patentable

Claim 12 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose specifying at most one prompt object for a template or filter property. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 6. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 12. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 12 be reversed.

13. Claim 13 is Separately Patentable

Claim 13 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the template comprising a set of templates properties and the filter comprises a set of filter properties and wherein every template and filter property may be specified as a prompt object. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 6. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 13. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 13 be reversed.

14. Claim 14 is Separately Patentable

The rejection is improper because **Alexander fails to teach each and every claim limitation** for claim 14 rejected under 102(e).

Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the Patent Office bears the burden of presenting at least a prima facie case of anticipation. In re Sun, 31 USPQ2d 1451, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished).

Anticipation requires that a prior art reference disclose, either expressly or under the principles of inherency, each and every element of the claimed invention. Id.. “In addition, the prior art reference must be enabling.” Akzo N.V. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479, 1 USPQ2d 1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987). That is, the prior art reference must sufficiently describe the claimed invention so as to have placed the public in possession of it. In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533, 226 USPQ 619, 621 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Such possession is effected only if one of ordinary skill in the art could have combined the disclosure in the prior art reference with his/her own knowledge to make the claimed invention. Id.. As stated in MPEP § 2131, “[a] claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

Referring to claim 14, the disclosure of Alexander fails to show at least the limitation directed to a “***prompt object*** comprising: a question to be asked of a user; a ***prompt type***; and at least one ***validation property***” (emphasis added).

On page 3 of the Office Action, it is alleged that Alexander teaches these features in paragraphs [0027], [0029], and [0034]. However, in these paragraphs, Alexander discloses nothing more than a survey created by a survey manager. In fact, page 3 of the Office Action improperly equates the survey of Alexander with the claimed prompt object when it states that “survey, which is equivalent to a prompt object, is classified by types such as medical, political, or product preference.” The Office Action further alleges that “values assigned to the answers” are allegedly for “validating right answers” to constitute at least one validation property. Office Action at p. 3. Appellants respectfully disagree.

Contrary to the statements made in the Office Action, assigning different types of answers to questions in a survey does not imply that the survey includes a prompt type and a validation property for a data type of the answer. In fact, Alexander does not even use the terminology “validation,” “data type,” or “prompt type” anywhere in its disclosure. Furthermore, the Office Action alleges that because the prompt object includes a question and that Alexander’s surveys are classified by various types (e.g., “political, medical, or product preference”), the “survey type, thus, is the prompt object type.” Office Action at p. 6. This is clearly an improper assumption because the prompt object, as claimed, comprises both a “question” and a “prompt type.” Under the Office’s logic, the question is the *same* as the prompt type. This is clearly distinguishable from the claimed invention because the prompt object of claim 14 includes both a prompt type and a question. Fig. 14 of the present application clearly shows prompt types according to an exemplary embodiment.

Hence, it appears that the Office is arguing that Alexander’s survey *inherently* includes a prompt type and information that validates a “data-type” of the answer. Appellants note that:

“To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence ‘must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill. Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.’” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745, 49 USPQ2d 1949, 1950-51 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

The cited paragraphs do not, however, disclose that Alexander’s survey necessarily includes a prompt type or a validation property to validate a “data type” of an answer. Rather, paragraphs [0027], [0029], and [0034] merely indicate that a user may: (1) “only select one of the possible answers;” (2) select “a single suggested answer or to enter a more appropriate answer than those suggested;” (3) select “as many suggested answers as appropriate;” or (4)

enter a “free text answer [that] does not provide any suggested answers, but allows the user to enter an appropriate answer.” Nowhere does paragraph [0027], [0029], or [0034] of Alexander explicitly or implicitly teach that the survey includes a ***prompt type*** and a ***validation property*** for validating data types of answers. Alexander does not even disclose any component or program validating “data types” of answers, contrary to the assertion made in the Office Action. The Office Action speculates and improperly assumes that Alexander’s survey includes this feature, however, in light of *In re Robertson*, “[i]nherency. . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.” *Id.*

Thus, the Office has not shown that Alexander’s survey includes a prompt type *and* a validation property to anticipate the feature of “the prompt object comprising: ... a prompt type; and at least one validation property,” as recited in claim 14. Furthermore, dependent claim 15, for example, clarifies that the “at least one validation property comprises verification that the answer provided to the question is of the specified prompt type.” Nowhere is this taught or even mentioned in Alexander. Nevertheless, the Office Action improperly cites paragraphs (e.g., [0027], [0029], and [0034]) to assert that Alexander allegedly teaches these features.

As a result, the disclosure of Alexander fails to teach or show at least the limitation directed to “***prompt object*** comprising: a question to be asked of a user; a ***prompt type***; and at least one ***validation property***,” as expressly recited in claim 14.

Accordingly, for at least this reason, Alexander does not teach **each and every limitation** of claim 14 and the rejection of claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) should be reversed.

15. Claim 15 is Separately Patentable

Claim 15 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose at least one validation property comprising verification that the answer provided to the question is of the

specified prompt type. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 14. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 15. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 15 be reversed.

16. Claim 16 is Separately Patentable

Claim 16 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the prompt object further comprising a default answer to the question. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 14. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 16. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 16 be reversed.

17. Claim 17 is Separately Patentable

Claim 17 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the prompt object further comprising a meaning that, upon request by a responder to the prompt, provides an explanation of the question. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 14. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 17. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 17 be reversed.

18. Claim 18 is Separately Patentable

Claim 18 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the prompt object further comprising a reuse value that indicates whether an answer provided from a previous instance of that prompt object, a default value or a new value is to be used for an answer to the question in the prompt object. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 14. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 18. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 18 be reversed.

19. Claim 19 is Separately Patentable

Claim 19 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose code for enabling a user to specify a single prompt object for a plurality of properties in a report definition object and wherein upon report execution, the question receives only one answer that is provided to a each property properties for which the prompt object was specified. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 14. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 19. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 19 be reversed.

20. Claim 20 is Separately Patentable

Claim 20 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the template comprising a set of templates properties and the filter comprises a set of filter properties and

further comprising code for causing a processor to enable a user to specify a prompt object for each template and filter property selected. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 14. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 20. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 20 be reversed.

21. Claim 21 is Separately Patentable

The rejection is improper because **Alexander fails to teach each and every claim limitation** for claim 21 rejected under 102(e).

Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the Patent Office bears the burden of presenting at least a prima facie case of anticipation. In re Sun, 31 USPQ2d 1451, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished). Anticipation requires that a prior art reference disclose, either expressly or under the principles of inherency, each and every element of the claimed invention. Id. "In addition, the prior art reference must be enabling." Akzo N.V. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479, 1 USPQ2d 1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987). That is, the prior art reference must sufficiently describe the claimed invention so as to have placed the public in possession of it. In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533, 226 USPQ 619, 621 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Such possession is effected only if one of ordinary skill in the art could have combined the disclosure in the prior art reference with his/her own knowledge to make the claimed invention. Id. As stated in MPEP § 2131, "[a] claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single

prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

Referring to claim 21, the disclosure of Alexander fails to show at least the limitation directed to a “*prompt object* comprising: a question to be asked of a user; a *prompt type*; and at least one *validation property*” (emphasis added).

On page 3 of the Office Action, it is alleged that Alexander teaches these features in paragraphs [0027], [0029], and [0034]. However, in these paragraphs, Alexander discloses nothing more than a survey created by a survey manager. In fact, page 3 of the Office Action improperly equates the survey of Alexander with the claimed prompt object when it states that “survey, which is equivalent to a prompt object, is classified by types such as medical, political, or product preference.” The Office Action further alleges that “values assigned to the answers” are allegedly for “validating right answers” to constitute at least one validation property. Office Action at p. 3. Appellants respectfully disagree.

Contrary to the statements made in the Office Action, assigning different types of answers to questions in a survey does not imply that the survey includes a prompt type and a validation property for a data type of the answer. In fact, Alexander does not even use the terminology “validation,” “data type,” or “prompt type” anywhere in its disclosure. Furthermore, the Office Action alleges that because the prompt object includes a question and that Alexander’s surveys are classified by various types (e.g., “political, medical, or product preference”), the “survey type, thus, is the prompt object type.” Office Action at p. 6. This is clearly an improper assumption because the prompt object, as claimed, comprises both a “question” and a “prompt type.” Under the Office’s logic, the question is the *same* as the prompt type. This is clearly distinguishable from the claimed invention because the prompt object of

claim 21 includes both a prompt type and a question. Fig. 14 of the present application clearly shows prompt types according to an exemplary embodiment.

Hence, it appears that the Office is arguing that Alexander's survey *inherently* includes a prompt type and information that validates a "data-type" of the answer. Appellants note that:

"To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence 'must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill. Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.'" *In re Robertson*, 169 F.3d 743, 745, 49 USPQ2d 1949, 1950-51 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

The cited paragraphs do not, however, disclose that Alexander's survey necessarily includes a prompt type or a validation property to validate a "data type" of an answer. Rather, paragraphs [0027], [0029], and [0034] merely indicate that a user may: (1) "only select one of the possible answers;" (2) select "a single suggested answer or to enter a more appropriate answer than those suggested;" (3) select "as many suggested answers as appropriate;" or (4) enter a "free text answer [that] does not provide any suggested answers, but allows the user to enter an appropriate answer." Nowhere does paragraph [0027], [0029], or [0034] of Alexander explicitly or implicitly teach that the survey includes a ***prompt type*** and a ***validation property*** for validating data types of answers. Alexander does not even disclose any component or program validating "data types" of answers, contrary to the assertion made in the Office Action. The Office Action speculates and improperly assumes that Alexander's survey includes this feature, however, in light of *In re Robertson*, "[i]nherency. . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities." *Id.*

Thus, the Office has not shown that Alexander's survey includes a prompt type *and* a validation property to anticipate the feature of "the prompt object comprising: ... a prompt type;

and at least one validation property,” as recited in claim 21. Furthermore, dependent claim 22, for example, clarifies that the “at least one validation property comprises verification that the answer provided to the question is of the specified prompt type.” Nowhere is this taught or even mentioned in Alexander. Nevertheless, the Office Action improperly cites paragraphs (e.g., [0027], [0029], and [0034]) to assert that Alexander allegedly teaches these features.

As a result, the disclosure of Alexander fails to teach or show at least the limitation directed to “*prompt object* comprising: a question to be asked of a user; a *prompt type*; and at least one *validation property*,” as expressly recited in claim 21.

Accordingly, for at least this reason, Alexander does not teach **each and every limitation** of claim 21 and the rejection of claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) should be reversed.

22. Claim 22 is Separately Patentable

Claim 22 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose at least one validation property comprising verification that the answer provided to the question is of the specified prompt type. The Office Action’s rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 21. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 22. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 22 be reversed.

23. Claim 23 is Separately Patentable

Claim 23 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the prompt object further comprising a default answer to the question. The Office Action’s rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 21. Alexander fails to show

each and every limitation of claim 23. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 23 be reversed.

24. Claim 24 is Separately Patentable

Claim 24 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the prompt object further comprising a meaning that, upon request by a responder to the prompt, provides an explanation of the question. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 21. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 24. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 24 be reversed.

25. Claim 25 is Separately Patentable

Claim 25 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the prompt object further comprising a reuse value that indicates whether an answer provided from a previous instance of that prompt object, a default value or a new value is to be used for an answer to the question in the prompt object. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 21. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 25. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 25 be reversed.

26. Claim 26 is Separately Patentable

Claim 26 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the report selection means enables a report creator to specify a single prompt object for a plurality of properties in the report and wherein upon report execution, the question receives only one answer that is provided to a each property properties for which the prompt object was specified. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 21. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 26. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 26 be reversed.

27. Claim 27 is Separately Patentable

Claim 27 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the report selection means enables a report creator to specify at most one prompt object for a template or filter property. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 21. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 27. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.

For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 27 be reversed.

28. Claim 28 is Separately Patentable

Claim 28 is separately patentable because Alexander fails to disclose the template comprising a set of templates properties and the filter comprises a set of filter properties and

wherein every template and filter property may be specified as a prompt object. The Office Action's rejection of this claim is improper for the reasons set forth above with respect to claim 21. Alexander fails to show each and every limitation of claim 28. In addition, there is no teaching, motivation, or rationale of obviousness to modify any of the applied references to include this feature.


For at least the above reasons Appellants respectfully request that the rejection of claim 28 be reversed.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Appellants respectfully requests that the Board reverse the prior art rejections set forth in the Final Office Action. The Director is hereby authorized to treat any current or future reply, requiring a petition for an extension of time for its timely submission as incorporating a petition for extension of time for the appropriate length of time. Appellants also authorize the Director to credit and differences or overpayment of fees to the undersigned's Deposit Account No. 50-0206.

Date: April 2, 2009

Respectfully submitted,



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VIII. CLAIMS APPENDIX

1. (Previously Presented) A prompt object on a computer-readable medium used in creating a report to be executed in a reporting system, wherein the report may specify a prompt object as a property of the report, the prompt object comprising:

- a question to be asked of a user;
- a prompt type; and
- at least one validation property;

wherein the prompt object is used in creating a report to be executed in a reporting system, wherein the report may specify a prompt object as a property of the report, and wherein the prompt object is an object separate from the report such that the prompt object may be used more than once in a single report or may be used in more than one report.

2. (Previously Presented) The prompt object of claim 1 wherein at least one validation property comprises verification that the answer provided to the question is of the specified prompt type.

3. (Original) The prompt object of claim 1 further comprising a default answer to the question.

4. (Original) The prompt object of claim 1 further comprising a meaning that, upon request by a responder to the prompt, provides an explanation of the question.

5. (Original) The prompt object of claim 1 further comprising a reuse value that indicates whether an answer provided from a previous instance of that prompt object, a default value or a new value is to be used for an answer to the question in the prompt object.

6. (Previously Presented) A computer-implemented method of creating a report to be executed on a reporting system the method comprising the steps of:

- selecting a template with one or more template properties;
 - selecting a filter with one or more filter properties; and
 - specifying one or more of the template or filter properties with a prompt object;
- wherein the prompt object comprises:
- a question to be asked of a user;
 - a prompt type; and
 - at least one validation property, wherein the prompt object is an object

separate from the report and separate from the one or more templates or filters such that the prompt object may be used more than once in a single report or may be used in more than one report.

7. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 6 wherein at least one validation property comprises verification that the answer provided to the question is of the specified prompt type.

8. (Original) The method of claim 6 wherein the prompt object further comprises a default answer to the question.

9. (Original) The method of claim 6 wherein the prompt object further comprises a meaning that, upon request by a responder to the prompt, provides an explanation of the question.

10. (Original) The method of claim 6 wherein the prompt object further comprises a reuse value that indicates whether an answer provided from a previous instance of that prompt object, a default value or a new value is to be used for an answer to the question in the prompt object.

11. (Previously presented) The method of claim 6 further comprising the step of specifying a single prompt object for a plurality of properties in the report and wherein upon report execution, the question receives only one answer that is provided to a each property properties for which the prompt object was specified.

12. (Original) The method of claim 6 further comprising specifying at most one prompt object for a template or filter property.

13. (Original) The method of claim 6 wherein the template comprises a set of templates properties and the filter comprises a set of filter properties and wherein every template and filter property may be specified as a prompt object.

14. (Previously Presented) A processor-readable medium comprising code for execution by a processor to create a report to be executed on a reporting system, the medium comprising:

code for causing a processor to enable a user to select a template with one or more template properties;

code for causing a processor to enable a user to select a filter with one or more filter properties; and

code for causing a processor to enable a user to specify one or more of the template or filter properties with a prompt object;

wherein the prompt object comprises:

a question to be asked of a user;

a prompt type; and

at least one validation property, wherein the prompt object is an object separate from the report such that the prompt object may be used more than once in a single report or may be used in more than one report.

15. (Previously Presented) The medium of claim 14 wherein at least one validation property comprises verification that the answer provided to the question is of the specified prompt type.

16. (Original) The medium of claim 14 wherein the prompt object further comprises a default answer to the question.

17. (Original) The medium of claim 14 wherein the prompt object further comprises a meaning that, upon request by a responder to the prompt, provides an explanation of the question.

18. (Original) The medium of claim 14 wherein the prompt object further comprises a reuse value that indicates whether an answer provided from a previous instance of that prompt object, a default value or a new value is to be used for an answer to the question in the prompt object.

19. (Previously presented) The medium of claim 14 further comprising code for enabling a user to specify a single prompt object for a plurality of properties in a report definition object and wherein upon report execution, the question receives only one answer that is provided to a each property properties for which the prompt object was specified.

20. (Original) The medium of claim 14 wherein the template comprises a set of templates properties and the filter comprises a set of filter properties and further comprising code for causing a processor to enable a user to specify a prompt object fear each template and filter property selected.

21. (Previously Presented) A system for a report to be executed on a reporting system comprising of:

report selection means embodied on a computer-readable medium that enables a report

creator to define one or more of a template, filter, or properties thereof with a prompt object;

wherein the prompt object comprises:

a question to be asked of a user;

a prompt type; and

at least one validation property, wherein the prompt object is an object separate from the report such that the prompt object may be used more than once in a single report or may be used in more than one report.

22. (Previously Presented) The system of claim 21 wherein at least one validation property comprises verification that the answer provided to the question is of the specified prompt type.

23. (Original) The system of claim 21 wherein the prompt object further comprises a default answer to the question.

24. (Original) The system of claim 21 wherein the prompt object further comprises a meaning that, upon request by a responder to the prompt, provides an explanation of the question.

25. (Original) The system of claim 21 wherein the prompt object further comprises a reuse value that indicates whether an answer provided from a previous instance of that prompt object, a default value or a new value is to be used for an answer to the question in the prompt object.

26. (Previously presented) The system of claim 21 wherein the report selection means enables a report creator to specify a single prompt object for a plurality of properties in the report and wherein upon report execution, the question receives only one answer that is provided to a each property properties for which the prompt object was specified.

27. (Original) The system of claim 21 wherein the report selection means enables a report creator to specify at most one prompt object for a template or filter property.

28. (Original) The system of claim 21 wherein the template comprises a set of templates properties and the filter comprises a set of filter properties and wherein every template and filter property may be specified as a prompt object.

IX. EVIDENCE APPENDIX

None.

X. RELATED PROCEEDINGS APPENDIX

None.